Bad excuse for the coup #4

The coup supporters have come up with an innovative excuse -- this one is a good coup.

I confess that I am first at lost by this excuse and don’t know how to respond. It is so ridiculous that I do not think it deserves a counter argument.

OK, the excuse proposes that there is a good and a bad coup. Apart from the previous three reasons [1) avoid bloodshed, 2) necessary evil and only solution, 3) from the worst crisis of the world], there is one extra qualification for a good coup, that it is the unique situation of the crisis in Thailand that no other place has experienced.

This reasoning cannot be wrong, but it explains nothing. It doesn't say how unique and in what ways such uniqueness justifies the necessity of the coup. If one says that a coup is a Thai way to solve the crisis, it is equivalent to saying nothing. It is a farce.

In fact I have a very serious argument that the coup is not as much anti-Thaksin as being a royalist coup. If being royalist is good, then it is a good coup. But if one thinks it is not good, then it is a bad coup. It depends on one's politics and ideology.

This coup is not only for toppling Thaksin. It is a royalist coup with purposes. If one is not so naive, Prem's fingerprints and footprints are all over the place for us to see. Below is part of an article I have written for a newspaper outside Thailand.

"The accusation that Thaksin disrespected to the monarchy masks a far deeper tension between Thaksin and the palace that ... cannot be discussed openly in Thailand. Over the years Thaksin had replaced Prem’s and the palace’s people in the military and in key bureaucratic agencies with his own men. He even patronized some princes and princesses. His financial influence over these royals was alarming --especially given the acute situation currently faced by the throne.

"King Bhumibol is now 79 years old and in fragile health. Because he has been on the throne since 1949, few in Thailand know any other king but him. Given his importance to the life of the whole country, no matter how the transition takes place, it will be one of the most critical moments in modern Thai history.

"Moreover, in the past fifty years, the royalists have orchestrated the elevation of the king to a super-human or semi-god on earth. Most Thais, and many foreign journalists and experts, have been taken in by the myth of the king as an earthly saint who stays “above”, i.e. beyond, politics. In fact, the palace and royalists have frequently intervened in politics by playing the role of the disinterested moral authority above, i.e. purer and higher than, the humanly dirty politics. The more successful is the monarchy’s role in modern democracy, the harder it is to be replicated. Things must be put in order before the next reign begins. Thailand is indeed at a critical and delicate juncture.

"To secure the desirable transition and continue such special role of the monarchy in social and political life, the royalists need three things: an heir who is popular with the public; a government that is obedient, even submissive, to royalist leadership; and finally, the ultimate key to the first two, a Privy Council that can command popular respect and with power to play the role of kingmaker in the coming transition to a new monarch.

"Thaksin threatened the royalist plan. To the royalists, he seemingly sought to adopt for himself the role of kingmaker. The royalist coup consolidates power to General Prem and the royalists, putting their plan on track. Will Thailand return to democracy under the guidance of an unelected Privy Council? The constitution that the royalists put in place will reveal the character of government and parliamentary system they have in mind. The anti-Thaksin coup is ultimately the re-assertion of the royalist rule for the transition."

This is perhaps the more important reason for a coup despite signs of weakening "Thaksin regime" before the coup. The coup is not as much about toppling Thaksin as for "Premocracy".

Is this a good or bad coup? It is up to your political and ideological taste.